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Abstract—We address the problem of secure and fault-tolerant
communication in the presence of adversaries across a multihop
wireless network with frequently changing topology. To effectively
cope with arbitrary malicious disruption of data transmissions,
we propose and evaluate the secure message transmission (SMT)
protocol and its alternative, the secure single-path (SSP) protocol.
Among the salient features of SMT and SSP is their ability to
operate solely in an end-to-end manner and without restrictive
assumptions on the network trust and security associations. As
a result, the protocols are applicable to a wide range of network
architectures. We demonstrate that highly reliable communication
can be sustained with small delay and small delay variability,
even when a substantial portion of the network nodes systemat-
ically or intermittently disrupt communication. SMT and SSP
robustly detect transmission failures and continuously configure
their operation to avoid and tolerate data loss, and to ensure the
availability of communication. This is achieved at the expense of
moderate transmission and routing overhead, which can be traded
off for delay. Overall, the ability of the protocols to mitigate both
malicious and benign faults allows fast and reliable data transport
even in highly adverse network environments.
Index Terms—Fault tolerance, mobile ad hoc network (MANET)
security, multipath routing, network security, secure data trans-
mission, secure message transmission, secure routing.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE EMERGING technology of mobile ad hoc networking(MANET) is based on wireless multihop architecture
without fixed infrastructure and prior configuration of the
network nodes. The salient features of this new networking
paradigm include: 1) collaborative support of basic networking
functions, such as routing and data transmission; 2) lack of
administrative boundaries of the network nodes; 3) absence
of a central entity in the network; and 4) transient, in general,
associations of the network nodes. As a result, a node cannot
make any assumption about the trustworthiness of its peers,
which assist the node with its communication and, in general,
does not possess their credentials.
Securing the basic network operation becomes one of the
primary concerns in ad hoc networks and, in fact, a prerequi-
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site for reliable and quality-of-service (QoS) communication in
adversarial environments. The challenge lies in securing com-
munication and maintaining connectivity in the presence of ad-
versaries, across an unknown, frequently changing multihop
wireless network topology. To address this complex problem
and provide comprehensive security, both phases of the com-
munication, the route discovery and the data transmission, must
be safeguarded.
Recently, a number of works proposed secure routing mech-
anisms to defend against a range of attacks under different as-
sumptions and system requirements [1]–[8]. However, secure
routing protocols alone, which ensure the correctness of the
route discovery, cannot guarantee secure and undisrupted de-
livery of data. In other words, a correct, up-to-date route cannot
be considered automatically free of adversaries. An intelligent
adversary can, for example, follow the rules of the route dis-
covery, place itself on a route, and later start redirecting traffic,
dropping, or forging and injecting data packets. Clearly, an ad-
versary can hide its malicious behavior for a long period of time
and strike at the least expected time. Thus, it is impossible to
discover such an adversary prior to its attack.
MANET routing, as well as secure routing protocols assume
mechanisms, such as reliable data link layer and route main-
tenance, which were not designed for and cannot cope with
malicious disruptions of the data transmission. Reliable trans-
port protocols cannot address the problem either: an attacker
can forge, for example, transmission control protocol (TCP)
acknowledgment, while dropping data packets, misleading
two communicating nodes that the data flow is undisrupted.
End-to-end security such as the IP-Security (IPSec) [9] au-
thentication header (AH) protocol [10] can prevent adversaries
from forging or corrupting data and feedback. But IPsec does
not allow the sender to detect loss of data and, thus, take any
corrective action. Nor the combination of security services and
reliable transport [e.g., stream control transmission protocol
(SCTP) [11]] provides an effective solution: a communication
failure can be detected, but the same, structurally intact yet
compromised path will be repeatedly utilized, because the
transport layer protocol cannot influence the choice of the route
in the network. Finally, multipath transmissions [12]–[14],
can protect against failures. However, “blind” redundant
transmissions alone can be highly inefficient without a robust
mechanism to detect transmission failures and adapt to the
network loss conditions.
Our contribution is a novel, general solution, tailored to the
MANET requirements, to effectively and efficiently secure
the data transmission phase: the secure message transmission
(SMT) and secure single-path (SSP) protocols. We emphasize
0733-8716/$20.00 © 2006 IEEE
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that the goal of SMT and SSP is not to securely discover routes
in the network—they assume that secure discovery of routes
has been already performed, although routes may not be free of
adversaries. Then, the goal of SMT and SSP, whose basic ideas
we presented in [15] and [16], is to secure the data transmission:
SMT and SSP operate without restrictive assumptions on the
network trust and security associations, promptly detect and
avoid nonoperational or compromised routes, tolerate loss of
data and control traffic, and adapt their operation to the network
conditions. Their main difference is that SMT utilizes multiple
paths simultaneously, in contrast to the single-path operation
of SSP.
In this paper, we extend, refine, and analyze the operation of
the two protocols. We present details and analyses of their mech-
anisms, including their interaction with the route discovery and
the maintenance of multiple paths, the path-rating algorithm and
a decision-theoretic model for the selection of its parameters, an
algorithm to estimate the probability of path survival, and three
alternative algorithms for automatic configuration of multipath
transmissions. Last but not least, we evaluate the performance
of SMT and SSP in a realistic network, integrating SMT and
SSP with the secure routing protocol (SRP) [1], [17] and the
IEEE 802.11 [18] as the data link protocol, and investigate the
interaction of SMT and TCP.
Our experiments show that SMT and SSP can support appli-
cations with differing objectives and operate in a wide range of
network conditions. The simultaneous usage of multiple paths
and the dispersion of transmitted data enable SMT to support
real-time traffic or other time-sensitive applications, even in
highly adverse environments. In addition to highly reliable data
delivery, SMT achieves low delay and low delay variability, at
the expense of multipath transmission overhead. The overall
overhead increase will be relatively low when real-time traffic
comprises a small fraction of the overall network traffic. In
resource-constrained environments, or when the supported
application does not impose delay constraints, SSP is the
appropriate lightweight alternative to SMT. SSP can provide
secure and highly reliable data communication, trading off
delay and delay variability for network overhead.
Moreover, we find that node mobility can be both detrimental
and beneficial in adversarial environments, in contrast to the
established belief that mobility impairs MANET communica-
tion. We also identify increased network load as a factor that
can magnify the impact of attacks by relatively weakening the
fault detection mechanisms. We combine SMT with TCP to pro-
vide flow control, and investigate their interaction: SMT thwarts
malicious and benign faults, while TCP adjusts the end-to-end
data rate according to the network conditions. Finally, we find
that, with SMT, persistent disruption of the data transmission is
more effective, from the adversary’s point of view, than inter-
mittent or “low-profile” attacks. Overall, our experiments show
that SMT and SSP are versatile, effective, and efficient in a wide
range of settings.
In the rest of this paper, we give a brief overview of the SMT
and SSP, after introducing the network and security models. We
present system components in Section IV, and the performance
evaluation results in Section V, before a discussion of related
literature and our conclusive remarks.
II. NETWORK AND SECURITY MODEL
We define a network node as a process with: 1) a unique iden-
tity ; 2) a public/private key pair , ; 3) a module im-
plementing the networking protocols, e.g., routing, data trans-
mission; and 4) a module providing communication across a
wireless network interface. The combination of an Internet pro-
tocol (IP) address and a public key can uniquely identify a node.
We assume that any two nodes and that wish to commu-
nicate in a secure manner are capable to establish an end-to-end
security association (SA). Since symmetric-key cryptographic
primitives are computationally more efficient than public-key
ones, we assume that a symmetric shared key instanti-
ates the SA between the end nodes, the source and the des-
tination . can be established through an authenticated
Diffie–Hellman exchange [19] integrated with the initial route
discovery [17]. Other methods to bootstrap associations are sur-
veyed in [21]. We emphasize that the operation of SMT and SSP
does not require that and are securely associated with any
of the remaining, intermediate network nodes, which assist the
S, communication.
We make no assumptions on the behavior or the motivation
of the intermediate nodes; they are either correct, that is,
comply with the protocol rules, or adversaries, deviating from
the protocol definition in an arbitrary manner. Adversaries
can target the route discovery and the data transmission, cor-
rupting, forging, or replaying routing, control, and data packets,
mounting an attack either intermittently or persistently, in an
attempt to control or deny communication.
We define a route as a sequence of nodes , which
we denote as -route when and . The route
discovery can be explicit, with the protocol returning the entire
sequence of nodes, or implicit, with the protocol performing
a distributed computation returning a -tuple of
the form (current node, relay node, destination) at each node
-route, . We assume that a secure
routing protocol safeguards the route discovery, discarding er-
roneous connectivity information, and returning correct routes.
A secure routing specification, that is, the sought properties
for discovered routes, independently of the protocol operation,
along with analyses of secure routing protocols, is given in [17]
and [22].
III. SECURE DATA TRANSMISSION
A. Secure Message Transmission (SMT) Protocol
SMT uses an active path set (APS) comprising node-disjoint
paths, determined and deemed operational at the source, for
communication with a specific destination (Section IV-A).
disperses each outgoing message, adding limited redundancy to
the data and dividing the resultant information into pieces,
which are transmitted across the APS routes one piece per route.
Even if some of the message pieces are lost or corrupted, suc-
cessful reception of out of pieces allows the reconstruc-
tion of the message at the destination. The ratio is
termed the redundancy factor, and we denote a dispersed mes-
sage with redundancy as an -message. Details and an
example of the dispersion algorithm [23], which acts in essence
as an erasure code, are given in [15].
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Fig. 1. SMT example: Transmission of a single message.
A message authentication code (MAC) [24], calculated with
, and a sequence number are appended to each piece, so
that can validate their integrity and origin authenticity, and
reject replayed traffic. reports successfully received pieces
back to , through cryptographically protected and dispersed
feedback. validates the feedback messages, unless a retrans-
mission timer (RTO) expires when none of the message or feed-
back pieces are received.
While transmitting across the APS, continuously updates
the rating of the APS routes (Section IV-B). For each suc-
cessful (failed) piece, the rating of the corresponding route is
increased (decreased). A path is discarded once it is deemed
failed, and a precaution is taken not to use the same path again
if it is rediscovered within some time after it was discarded.
While continuously assessing the quality of the utilized paths,
and gathering statistical information on the network condi-
tion through the trusted destination feedback (Sections IV-B,
IV-C), the protocol adjusts its configuration (Section IV-D), to
remain effective in highly adverse environments and efficient
in relatively benign conditions. In case the dispersed message
cannot be reconstructed, waits for to retransmit the missing
pieces, with a protocol-selectable maximum number of retrans-
missions, , per serviced message.
An illustrative example of a message transmission is shown in
Fig. 1. disperses the message so that any three out of the four
transmitted pieces are sufficient for successful reconstruction of
the original message. Two of the pieces, each routed across a
different route, arrive intact at the receiver, while the remaining
two pieces are compromised by adversaries on the transmission
paths; e.g., one piece is dropped and one (dashed arrow) is mod-
ified. The cryptographic integrity check reveals the corrupted
data, rejects the piece, and waits for additional message pieces
(as determined in the header of incoming validated pieces), after
setting a reception timer. At the timer expiration, the destina-
tion feedback is returned across the two operational paths. The
sender receives and validates the feedback, ignoring duplicates,
and retransmits the two missing pieces. One of them is lost, for
example, because of intermittent malicious behavior, however,
the destination has an adequate number of packets (3 out of 4),
and acknowledges the successful reception to complete the mes-
sage transmission.
B. Secure Single-Path (SSP) Protocol
SSP also provides data integrity, authenticity, and replay pro-
tection and it is equipped with the same end-to-end feedback and
fault detection mechanisms as SMT [16]. Their main difference
is that SSP transmits data across a single route, and does not per-
form data dispersion. In brief, SSP can be viewed as the limiting
case of SMT, with a single-route APS. If provided with mul-
tiple, redundant routes, SSP utilizes them alternately. Accord-
ingly, SSP provides feedback across a single route and switches
to a new route only after the current one is deemed failed. Due
to its single-path operation, SSP does not incur multipath trans-
mission overhead and does not require the discovery of multiple
routes, thus imposing in general less overhead than SMT. In the
rest of this paper, we refer to SMT and SSP interchangeably, dis-
tinguishing between the two when necessary. We present com-
ponents of the SMT and SSP protocols in Section IV, with Sec-
tion IV-D and most of Section IV-A relevant to SMT only.
IV. SYSTEM COMPONENTS
A. Route Discovery and Determination of the APS
SMT and SSP are largely independent of the nature of the
underlying secure routing protocol. Clearly, SMT requires that
the protocol return multiple routes, while SSP can interoperate
a protocol that returns a single route. They can both interoperate
routing protocols performing either explicit or implicit route
discovery (Section II). However, explicit route discovery, e.g.,
SRP [1], [7], [17] or SLSP [5], [17], or their combination, pro-
vides extensive control over the selection of the utilized routes.
The source (sender) can compose routes in general different than
those returned by the routing protocol, and, overall, implement
a wide range of route selection algorithms. Moreover, it can un-
ambiguously correlate loss/delivery of a packet with the route’s
constituent nodes (links) and, thus, avoid repeated attempts to
communicate across the same yet nonoperational route. These
two choices provide versatility and robustness.
An APS of node-disjoint paths is constructed by succes-
sively calculating the node-disjoint, shortest in number of hops,
paths [25], using the network connectivity information provided
by the route discovery. The method’s lack of sophistication is
not a significant limiting factor, because the protocol does not
have prior knowledge on the trustworthiness of individual net-
work nodes. Intuitively, the selection of shortest routes is equiv-
alent to the selection of the most secure paths, since any node
can be initially considered equally probable to be an adversary.
Node disjointness enhances the robustness of SMT, because
an adversary “strategically” situated on the overlap segment of
two (or more) partially disjoint routes would control communi-
cation across those routes. Nevertheless, it is possible the pro-
tocol operates in conditions that allow only a few node-disjoint
paths to be discovered, for example, due to a low-connectivity
network topology or disruption of the route discovery by adver-
saries. In the extreme, SMT will operate as SSP.
The number of paths SMT should operate with depends on the
protocol’s configuration objective (Section IV-D), or it can be
a protocol-selectable parameter. The richness of
the APS, however, cannot be ensured or “required” from the un-
derlying routing protocol. If available, a related route discovery
parameter, such as SRP’s number of route replies per query,
can be tuned. In general, SMT attempts to determine new paths
when new connectivity information is acquired, either proac-
tively, or reactively, after the invocation of a route discovery.
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However, route discoveries aiming to augment the APS must be
rate-limited, to avoid repeated invocations when no additional
(noncompromised) paths can be discovered. Finally, we note
that placing the route selection at the sender implies that data
are source-routed, functionality that is easy to combine with ex-
isting secure routing protocols.
B. Fault Detection
Each path in the APS is associated with a rating
, with the minimum and the
maximum values of the path rating. The initial rating, assigned
when a path is first added to the APS, is ,
with . Equation (1) summarizes how the rating is
updated after the th transmission across a path that is not
deemed failed yet, with constants
if loss
if success (1)
This path rating scheme is not sensitive to the attack pattern
an intelligent adversary selects. In general, an adversary could
select an attack pattern in an attempt to maximize the number
of packets it tampers with, while it remains undetected and the
route it controls in use. We showed in [15] that for any arbi-
trary selection of packets the attacker tampers with, the band-
width loss (BWL) over a path, that is, the fraction of discarded
or corrupted packets without the route deemed nonoperational,
is .
However, the performance of the protocol is sensitive to the ,
values. A criterion to determine the appropriate values
is necessary, depending on the consequences of the -se-
lection for any type of network and adversary. On the one hand,
a relatively good path should not be discarded because of a short
burst of errors. On the other hand, a poor path should be rejected
as soon as possible, to minimize the packet loss and the resul-
tant overhead. We model the selection of values as a de-
cision theory problem, with the most preferable pair of
values selected according to the mini-max regret criterion [26].
We present the decision-theoretic model and criterion in Ap-
pendix I, along with the proof of the Theorem, below, which
summarizes the -selection.
Theorem: If is the rating of a path , taking values in
, with , and two
constants such that is increased by for each successful
message reception and decreased by for each failed message
transmission across , then , must be selected so that, for
, , , and .
Fig. 2(a) shows the maximum regret for all -selections
as an example for a specific network setup. The formal definition
is given in Appendix 1, but, intuitively, the lower the regret the
more preferable is an pair. Route reliability takes values
, , ,
, , , the benefit from
a delivered message is , and the costs of a message
transmission and a route discovery are and ,
respectively. A new route discovery is performed only when the
utilized route is deemed failed, the data transmission stops after
discoveries if the th route is deemed failed, and
Fig. 2. Selection of the path rating protocol parameters. (a) Maximum regret
and (b) BWL, shown as a function of , .
packets are transmitted. Fig. 2(a) confirms that very low or very
high values result in high regret ( axis), independently of the
value of . It also shows that low results in high regret for
a wide range of values. In Fig. 2(b), BWL captures that with
the adversary can have full control over a path
. BWL is also high when is high, because the adversary can
easily allow the path rating (and essentially its own credibility)
to be reinstated. Finally, we observe in Fig. 2(a) a relatively wide
range of pairs that yield the same or almost the same low
regret. This can be valuable, because can be (re)selected
randomly among those highly preferable pairs, making it hard
for adversaries to infer the values in use and adjust their
attack pattern accordingly.
C. Path Survival Probability
We define the survival probability of the th path (route) in
APS as the probability that the path will remain operational for
the duration of the data transmission. We present here one algo-
rithm to estimate . We define the lifetime of the th route, , as
the time period from the discovery of the route until its removal
from the APS, when the route is deemed nonoperational. If the
route lifetime random variable is , with cumulative distribu-
tion function , then
is the path survival probability, with the current
path age, measured in seconds.
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Fig. 3. Example of the average estimated path survival probability p , for
indicative values of the route age t.
The algorithm collects lifetime samples at the points in time it
discards routes, with the most recent samples, used to estimate
the path survival probability at any time, , arranged
in increasing order. If is the transmission time of the longest






Equation (2) extends the estimator in [27] when
, to avoid overestimating or underestimating the path sur-
vival probability. If , (2) yields , thus, the
protocol avoids utilizing only one, newly calculated yet possibly
compromised route. If , (2) yields , thus,
the protocol does not ignore a long-lived but valid route.
The protocol should be allowed time to collect the initial
window of samples before it computes its first estimate; during
this time, all available routes are assigned some arbitrary (and
equal for all routes) survival probability. In Fig. 3, we show the
average estimate of , calculated from data collected from the
experiments in Section V, as a function of the route age and for
different values of the fraction of adversaries (FAs) present in
the network. As FA increases, the discovery of compromised
routes becomes more frequent, resulting in decreased proba-
bility estimates. Moreover, the older the route is, the lower is
its probability of survival.
D. Multipath Configuration
The protocol automatically adapts the configuration of the
message transmission, determining the redundancy factor and
which and how many of the APS routes to utilize. The inputs to
the configuration algorithm are: 1) an APS of paths; 2) their
ratings ; and 3) their survival probabilities, , for ;
4) an optimization objective; and 5) an objective-specific param-
eter, i.e., , the sought probability of successful message
delivery, or, , the maximum allowable redundancy. The
algorithm outputs are: 1) and , with and
2) the indices of the APS paths to be utilized
for the -message transmission.
Alg. 1. Calculation ofR, the probability of successful delivery of an (M;N)-
message across an APS of k paths, for all feasible M , N combinations.
We denote the probability of successful reception of an





seeks the lowest number of paths such that
is at least equal to ; it ensures resistance to fail-
ures, while keeping the multipath overhead and in particular the
number of message pieces low. seeks to achieve
with the lowest redundancy but without constraining .
Finally, seeks to maximize under the constraint that
does not exceed , to limit the transmission overhead.
The configuration algorithm ranks the paths in decreasing
order of their ratings, , then, for equally rated paths, in de-
creasing order of their survival probabilities , and, finally,
as a tiebreaker, in increasing order of their hop length. Then,
Alg. 1 calculates efficiently1 all the values for this or-
dering of paths and their corresponding values.
A search in is performed to determine the pair of
, values that satisfy the objective. For (3), a search along
the first row yields such that ,
and a search along the th column checks if ex-
ists so that . For (4), while maintaining
the lowest that yields , it suffices to
search each column until , because, for a fixed
, is a decreasing function of , and then move
to the next column. If does not satisfy the objec-
tive for any , then the values and corresponding paths that
simply maximize are returned. For (5), the column-
wise search continues till , while keeping track
1With each message piece sent across a distinct path, a transmission is suc-
cessful if any set ofM out ofN paths, is operational. In other words,R(M;N)
is the probability that at least one of those minimal path sets is operational. Due
to the path disjointness, the calculation of R(M;N) is straightforward, using
the inclusion–exclusion principle [29] or an improved method [30]. A more ef-
ficient solution is Alg. 1, based on [31] and [32]: k =2 R(i; j) values are cal-
culated for all i M , j  N , with O(k ) time and memory complexity.
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Fig. 4. Message delivery fraction (MDF). (a) SMT-LS. (b) SMT-RRD. (c) SSP.
of the maximum . The -message configuration is de-
termined independently for each message, as , , or the APS
itself, change over time.
If the constraint in (3) and (4) cannot be satisfied, then addi-
tional, new paths are required to enhance the likelihood of suc-
cessful reception. A more fine-grained decision on whether new
paths are necessary can be based on the condition of the cur-
rently utilized paths. The criterion, inspired by the reliability
importance of a component in a system [28], is the importance
of the not-yet-discovered st path, with denoting
its survival probability
(6)
is the probability that exactly of the paths are
operational, or in other words, the probability that the addition
of the st path will allow the transmission to
be successful. can be easily calculated from the matrix.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We implemented OPNET simulation models of SMT and
SSP, with a 1000 m 1000 m network coverage area and 50
nodes. The 802.11 [18] is the data link layer protocol. The nom-
inal communication range of 300 m yields biconnected net-
work topologies with high probability [33]. The data rate is
5.5 Mb/s, the buffer size at the medium access control layer is
655 Kbits and three constant-bit-rate (CBR) sources generate
four messages/s, with message size of 512 bytes. The buffer
at the network layer was not a limiting factor; i.e., no packets
were lost due to overflow at the source node. Each source is
securely associated with one destination, transmitting data to
the same destination throughout the simulated period of 900 s.
The nodes are initially uniformly distributed throughout the net-
work area and their movement is determined by the random
waypoint mobility model [34], with nodal speed uniformly dis-
tributed between 1 m/s and 20 m/s [35]. Each point on the pre-
sented graphs is the average of 30 randomly seeded runs with
90% confidence intervals shown. The number of adversaries is
0, 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25, and results are presented as a function of
the fraction of adversaries (FA) in the network, i.e., 0%, 10%,
20%, 30%, 40%, and 50%, respectively. Adversaries disrupt
the data transmission, tampering with in-transit packets, persis-
tently in Sections V-A–V-E, and intermittently in Section V-F.
The protocol parameters are set to , ,
, , , , unless noted,
otherwise.
We first examine SMT when routes are provided by an ideal-
ized discovery scheme with no delay and no control overhead.
This SMT with link-state (SMT-LS) instantiation allows us to
isolate the performance of SMT from the underlying routing
protocol, since different routing protocols may impose different
limitations (e.g., number of available routes), different delays,
and different amounts of overhead. Then, as a practical sce-
nario, we examine SMT and SSP in conjunction with the secure
routing protocol (SRP) [1], [17], denoting this SMT instanti-
ation as secure message transmission with reactive route dis-
covery (SMT-RRD).
The evaluated performance metrics are: 1) the message de-
livery fraction (MDF), i.e., the ratio of the number of received
messages to the number of transmitted messages; 2) the average
message delay , i.e., the period from the arrival (generation)
of a message at the source, until its reception at the destina-
tion; 3) the delay jitter , i.e., the delay variability around
the average delay; 4) the transmission overhead , i.e.,
the fraction of all bits transmitted by SMT and SSP, including
redundancy, protocol headers, and feedback, over the total of
successfully received data bits; and 5) (where applicable) the
routing overhead ROTV, i.e., the fraction of all the bits trans-
mitted (counted at each network hop) by the underlying routing
protocol, over the total of data bits successfully received at their
destination.
A. Reliability
SMT-LS, SMT-RRD, and SSP achieve highly reliable com-
munication, even when %. All three protocols can
promptly detect nonoperational paths, avoid them, and commu-
nicate across those supporting reliable communication. SMT
can minimize the number of retransmissions, since dispersion
across multiple paths masks data loss. The larger the number of
available paths, the larger the fault-tolerance, this being espe-
cially true for SMT-LS that operates with an APS of large car-
dinality (an average of 8.5 paths). Fig. 4(a) shows that without
retransmissions SMT-LS delivers more than
99% of the data for FA up to 20%, and experiences loss of 2% to
7% of the messages for FA from 30% to 50%. On the other hand,
the partial view of the network connectivity restricts SMT-RRD,
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Fig. 5. End-to-end message delay. (a) SMT. (b) SMT-RRD. (c) SSP.
Fig. 6. End-to-end message delay variability (jitter). (a) SMT-LS. (b) SMT-RRD. (c) SSP.
which operates with an APS of 3 node-disjoint paths with a stan-
dard deviation of 1.5 paths, while SSP discovers and utilizes
only a single route. Yet, SMT-RRD remains competitive with
SMT-LS, with 1% to 7% lower MDF [Fig. 4(b)], while MDF
for SSP is 3.1% to 10.3% lower for no retransmissions.
Retransmissions can mitigate this degradation to achieve
highly reliable communication. For a maximum of three
retransmissions per message, , SMT-LS
delivers more than 97% of the messages even when %.
The improvement is more significant for SMT-RRD, which
delivers only up to 2.3% to 4% fewer messages than SMT-LS
( %, 50%). SSP is only 1% less reliable than SMT-RRD
on the average. The differences between the protocols become
imperceptible when retransmissions fully correct data loss
. (Note: Messages with delays above 30 s
are ignored; up to 0.7% of the messages are not accounted for
in Fig. 5)
B. Delay and Delay Variability
Fig. 5(a) and (b) shows that SMT is capable of achieving
low delay, which remains nearly constant for networks with up
to 20% adversaries and increases only slowly as FA increases
further. This is expected when no retransmissions are used and
paths are readily available SMT-LS, but we find that this is
also the case for SMT-RRD and . Accordingly,
the delay variability shown in Fig. 6(a) and (b), increases
slowly for both SMT-LS and SMT-RRD, with the former
achieving 11%–75% lower jitter and 1%–64% lower delay than
the latter, for or 3. Delay and jitter are low
due to multipath transmission and the resultant scarce use of
retransmissions; e.g., for , SMT-RRD retransmits
(fully or partially) only 6.8% and SMT-LS only 3.4% of the
total transmissions.
This clues the ability of SMT to support real-time traffic
even in the presence of a significant fraction of adversaries,
greatly facilitated by its low-cost and effective path “testing”:
multipath transmissions allow for the rating of multiple paths
to be updated simultaneously with the actual data forwarding,
while use of low-rated paths does not result in message loss
due to the data dispersion.2 It is important that even with all but
one of the paths compromised, a single feedback message
allows SMT to update the rating of those paths without a
time-out. In contrast, SSP relies solely on timeouts to detect
transmission failures, and it is inherently slower in detecting a
compromised route. For example, with no retransmissions, the
delay for SSP [Fig. 5(c)] is 38%–480% larger than the delay for
SMT-RRD and 99%–486% higher than the delay for SMT-LS.
Similarly, the jitter for SSP [Fig. 6(c)] is 50%–307% higher
than SMT-RRD and 208%–380% higher than SMT-LS. As
the number of retransmissions increases, SSP experiences up
to 155% and 237% higher delays, and up to 105% and 237%
higher jitter than SMT-RRD and SMT-LS, respectively.
2We emphasize that the protocols do not assume knowledge on the trustworth-
iness of individual nodes or their misbehavior patterns, and they do not rely on
“testing.” Rather, they transmit actual data, while determining the condition of
the APS paths.
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Fig. 7. Transmission overhead (TXOV). (a) SMT-LS. (b) SMT-RRD. (c) SSP.
Fig. 8. Routing overhead (RTOV). (a) SMT-RRD as a function of FA. (b) SSP as a function of FA. (c) SMT-RRD as a function of PT.
The case of has a special interest, as the
delay and the jitter [Figs. 5 and 6] are then significantly larger
for all the protocols, compared with or 3. We
observed in Fig. 4 that these additional retransmissions offer up
to 7% higher MDF for SSP, up to 6.3% for SMT-RRD, and up
to 2% for SMT-LS, when . However, this comes
at the comparatively large cost of increasing the delay from
102% to 290%. The reason becomes apparent by examining,
in comparison, traces of communication for one of the flows
for and 50%; in the latter case, nodes may get dis-
connected for long periods of time, with messages backlogged
during such periods of disconnection and delivered only after
repeated (and possibly many) retransmissions.
C. Overhead and Multipath Configuration
The discussion above demonstrated that the availability of
many paths can be beneficial. However, this comes at the cost
of increased network overhead. Fig. 7 shows that SMT-LS has
the largest and SSP the smallest overhead, with the overhead
being roughly proportional to the APS cardinality. (Note: The
SMT header is 22 bytes long and the SMT feedback size is
19–35 bytes, both including an 80-bit HMAC [24].) SSP im-
poses transmission overhead which is 54% smaller than that
of SMT-RRD and 78% smaller than that of SMT-LS [Fig. 7]
and 73% smaller routing overhead than SMT-RRD [Fig. 8(a)
and (b)]. This implies that, essentially, SSP trades off delay and
delay variability for transmission and routing overhead.
Next, we examine the three configuration algorithms from
Section IV-D with SMT-LS, to allow the algorithms to operate
over a wider range of parameters; results for and are
shown in Fig. 10(a) and (b), respectively. utilizes
on the average five paths while requiring the successful delivery,
practically at all times, of one message piece. For high
and not close to 1, it highly unlikely to have such
that . In comparison,
utilizes up to 35% more paths, while the average transmission
redundancy is up to 9% smaller, because a larger is chosen.
does not achieve an impressive reduction in the
redundancy, because is set to a large value. But, in gen-
eral, it trades off fault-tolerance (higher ), for more effective
path “testing” (higher ) at the same or smaller cost. The com-
bination of this testing with the use of highly rated paths, even
when their is small, allows to achieve 18%
to 33% lower delay than , while achieving the
same MDF.
For both and , decreases
as FA increases, even though one would expect the opposite.
However, a large fraction of adversaries implies it is more likely
that any discovered route will be compromised. SMT may start
with a large APS, but it soon discards the compromised routes,
and operates with the remaining operational ones. We con-
firmed this from the histogram of the utilized APS sizes, which
is shifted and becomes more concentrated toward lower values
as FA increases.
In Fig. 10, we also observe that the configuration, for
which we chose , utilizes on the average
paths, and slightly above 2. achieves from 6% to 25%
smaller delay than and 37% to 42% smaller than
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Fig. 9. Impact of mobility; SMT-RRD. (a) Message delivery fraction (MDF).
(b) End-to-end message delay (D).
the . This clues that even a relatively limited
number of paths and redundancy can yield effective communi-
cation, very similarly to SMT-RRD. Finally, Fig. 11(a) shows
the average decreasing with FA increasing, as expected, and
Fig. 11(b) shows, for the algorithm, “fol-
lowing” the protocol-selectable parameter .
D. Mobility
Mobility is modeled in our simulation by the pause time (PT);
for low mobility, PT is high and vice versa. We find that when
the fraction of adversarial nodes is relatively small ( %),
data loss due to route breakages and due to adversaries is masked
by SMT-RRD, and mobility has a small impact on the protocol
performance. This is demonstrated in Fig. 9, with the protocol
achieving almost perfectly reliable communication without an
increase in delay. In contrast, mobility has higher impact for
a large fraction of adversaries ( %). As mobility de-
creases, MDF decreases up to 5% and the delay increases up
to 153% ( s), and then MDF and delay gradually in-
crease and decrease, respectively, as PT increases further. Even-
tually, for s, MDF is 1% to 4% lower than MDF for
s, while the delay and jitter are up to 42% and 21%
smaller, respectively.
These observations indicate that mobility can be both benefi-
cial and detrimental to the protocol operation. When no opera-
tional paths are available, reconfiguration of the network due to
Fig. 10. Transmission redundancy. (a) Average number of sent pieces (N).
(b) Average number of required pieces (M).
mobility can restore connectivity. On the other hand, mobility
causes breakage of routes that are free of adversaries, possibly
adversely impacting the connectivity. As a result, both the delay
and the reliability of the communication may deteriorate. The
first trend explains why MDF is larger for higher mobility and
is reduced as mobility decreases ( s), and the second
trend explains why delay decreases as mobility decreases fur-
ther. However, MDF remains slightly smaller for 600 s than
for 0 s, because a small percentage of transmissions suffer long
disconnection periods, while most of the transmitted data un-
dergo very few interruptions. The low mobility ( s)
emphasizes both tendencies, causing larger spread of the delay,
and especially the routing overhead [Fig. 8(c)], with pronounced
RTOV variability due to the repeated route discoveries by dis-
connected nodes.
E. Load and Interaction With TCP
In Sections V-A–V-D, we evaluated SMT with constant bit-
rate data flows. We examine now its performance as the offered
load increases. Note that SMT does not provide flow control
mechanisms, which is a functionality of transport layer pro-
tocols, such as TCP. We increase first the load offered by the
CBR sources, up to the point the average end-to-end throughput
cannot increase further, for % and constant mobility
( s). In Fig. 12(a), the network is saturated when 16
messages/s per flow are transmitted ( %), with the
degradation already visible for 14 messages/s ( %).
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Fig. 11. AverageR(M ;N ) as a function of: (a) fraction of adversaries.
(b) P , for P   N objective.
Fig. 12(b) is more suggestive, with the delay increasing fast for
rates above 12 messages/s. A close look at the data link layer
confirms that the network becomes gradually more congested;
the delay to access the medium increases by 218% and the route
errors (i.e., lost hopwise transmissions) increase by 260%. SMT
can tolerate such failures, but only partially as the network gets
saturated. Not only does the network impair communication,
but the impact of adversaries also becomes more severe. In a
heavily loaded network, the RTO estimate will be set inevitably
to a high value to reflect the increased round-trip times. High
RTO implies slow detection of transmission failures, which, in
turn, implies higher message loss across compromised paths. In
our experiment, as compared with the transmission of 10 mes-
sages/s, the fraction of message pieces that adversaries drop is
tripled when 16 messages/s are transmitted, with the adversary
disrupting 4% and 14% of the SMT message transmissions, re-
spectively.
Next, we integrate SMT with TCP, and have the communica-
tion data rate regulated by the TCP flow control mechanism. We
establish ftp sessions with the source “uploading” 1.5 MB files
to the destination, one after another. We use the default settings
for TCP, the New Reno flow control mechanism, and time-based
TCP retransmission thresholds. We select to utilize SMT-RRD
with , so that SMT and TCP have mostly dis-
tinct roles: on the one hand, SMT is responsible for adapting
Fig. 12. SMT-RRD performance as a function of network load. (a) Average
throughput. (b) End-to-end message delay (D).
and configuring transmissions to mitigate malicious and benign
failures, possibly with limited fast retransmissions. On the other
hand, TCP is responsible for retransmitting all data and espe-
cially those that SMT did not deliver. It is expected that TCP
and SMT retransmissions do not overlap ( s
and s), while SMT frequently uses partial re-
transmissions, without RTO expiring.3
We measured the performance of the combined TCP-
SMT-SRP system in the same mobility scenarios of the in-
creased CBR load, as well as in a benign ( %) and
in a more adverse ( %) environment. As a point of
reference, we also evaluated TCP combined with SRP and
no data transmission security for the same set of scenarios.
Fig. 13(a) shows that with the data rate controlled by the TCP
flow control, the average end-to-end throughput achieved is
approximately equal to 12 messages/second per flow, while the
end-to-end delay [Fig. 13(b)] is 56% lower than the delay for
CBR flows with the same rate. TCP “estimates” the available
bandwidth, which in the case of malicious environments reflects
the operation of the underlying SMT that tolerates faults. While
SMT successfully masks data loss and prevents retransmissions
at the transport layer, TCP increases the rate of transmitted
3Depending on the algorithm, the fractions of partial SMT retransmissions
are: 11%–18% for P   N , 37%–56% for P   r , and
14%–47% for r .
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Fig. 13. Integration of SMT-RRD with TCP. (a) Average throughput.
(b) End-to-end message delay (D).
data. When adversaries, route breakages, or congestion causes
data loss that SMT cannot tolerate, TCP inevitably enters
congestion avoidance or returns to the slow-start phase, while
SMT recovers, for example, by reconfiguring transmissions
across alternative routes.
The ability of SMT to safeguard the flow of data is apparent
as the FA increases from 10% to 30% and the throughput re-
mains practically constant. In contrast, when no security for the
data transmission is available, the end-to-end throughput drops
abruptly as the fraction of adversaries increase. Along a compro-
mised path, an adversary can drop a fraction of in-transit data or
feedback messages and still force the flow of data at a very low
rate; only if a route error occurs, data will be rerouted across an
alternative route.4
With %, we observe that TCP-SRP achieves 15%
higher throughput than TCP-SMT on the average but with
250% higher variability. When the path is compromised, the
TCP-SRP throughput is practically zero, but, otherwise, it can
be twice as large as that of TCP-SMT when no malicious
disruptions occur. SMT’s roughly threefold transmission over-
head, as compared with the single-path SRP forwarding, is the
reason for TCP-SMT achieving 46% smaller throughput when
%.
4We did not implement it here, but an adversary can always hide a route
breakage at a downstream link by discarding route error packets.
Fig. 14. SMT-RRD performance as a function of the attack pattern. (a) MDF.
(b) Delay variability (jitter).
F. Variable Attack Patterns
In all experiments above, the adversaries dropped all
in-transit data packets. We do not present results with adver-
saries corrupting data or SMT feedback, which are detected
at the destination and source, respectively, since these attacks
did not produce any significant difference. We conjecture
that persistent disruption of the data transmission is the worst
form of attack, as it has the most severe impact, compared
with attackers that intermittently tamper with data. Clearly, an
intelligent intermittent attacker could selectively discard data
and still degrade communication. However, the dispersion of
data across multiple paths makes it hard for adversaries to be
effective: it would require that at least of the pieces were
dropped by coordinated adversaries. It is, nevertheless, in-
teresting to investigate the impact of intermittent misbehavior,
which could allow an adversary to remain on a utilized route.
We evaluate SMT-RRD with % and each ad-
versary dropping data with a probability , which has
average value and it is selected
uniformly from the (0, 0.1), (0, 0.5), (0.25, 0.75), (0.5, 1) inter-
vals, respectively. In all runs, SMT uses the same parameters
and . Fig. 14(a) shows
that MDF decreases slowly; for example, as increases
from 0.25 to 0.5, the fraction of data packets dropped by the
adversary increases by 41% but MDF decreases only by 1.5%.
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Nevertheless, it is obvious that performance, shown here by
MDF and jitter [Fig. 14(b)], deteriorates as attackers become
more persistent.
VI. RELATED WORK
The use of multiple paths has been widely studied for the pro-
vision of QoS guarantees and load balancing in wired networks.
In MANET, multiple paths have been utilized as a means to tol-
erate path breakages due to mobility. Reference [12] proposes
the collection of link quality (reliability) metrics and the fast
determination of a set of highly reliable, and thus, long-lived,
link-disjoint paths (as opposed to node-disjoint paths that we
use here). References [13] and [14] propose the use of diver-
sity coding and provide an approximation for the probability of
successful data transmission. None of the two above-mentioned
schemes provides security features or mechanisms to assess the
quality of utilized routes in an end-to-end manner.
A number of works secured the MANET route discovery.
Beyond SRP, [2] proposed a secured version of the ad hoc
on-demand distance vector (AODV) routing protocol [36],
using public key mechanisms to authenticate the end to in-
termediate nodes and set forward and backward routes, and a
hash-chain to prevent adversaries from decreasing the route hop
count. Reference [3] proposed a protocol to secure the dynamic
source routing (DSR) protocol [37], using symmetric-key
primitives and time synchronization to authenticate the nodes
of the discovered routes. Reference [4] uses public-key primi-
tives for a secure routing protocol that resembles AODV, with
simplified functionality. Reference [6] is a secure proactive
distance-vector routing protocol, [5] is a secure link-state pro-
tocol discovering network connectivity within a zone [38] of
hops, and [39] proposes security mechanisms for the optimized
link-state routing protocol (OLSR) protocol [40].
As for MANET data transmission security, the use of mul-
tiple routes was first proposed in [20] and [1]. Reference [41]
proposed an “onion encryption”-based mechanism to detect a
faulty link, with one of its incident nodes disrupting the data
transmission, if data loss along a route drops below a tolerable
threshold. From a different perspective, [42] proposed to detect
misbehaving nodes by local monitoring and disseminate alerts
for such events, so that routes through relatively well-behaved
peers are selected. Reference [43] seeks to isolate misbehaving
nodes, and also relies on dissemination of misbehavior reports,
with the provision of authenticating those messages. Reference
[44] proposes to stimulate cooperation of rational nodes through
fictitious currency and remuneration, and a game-theoretic mo-
tivation for a reputation system is proposed in [45].
Unlike previous works, SMT provides a solution tailored
to MANET environment, combining four elements: 1) re-
liance only on end-to-end security bindings; 2) simultaneous
transmission across multiple, diverse routes determined by
the protocol; 3) robust detection of communication faults;
and 4) adaptation to the network condition. Such or similar
features were proposed individually, e.g., [10], [12]–[14], and
[46], but they were not combined before into one protocol.
SMT can interoperate secure routing protocols and provide
comprehensive security, by securing the data transmission
phase. Meanwhile, SMT’s end-to-end robust fault detection
can eliminate abuse of the route maintenance operation of such
protocols, preventing adversaries from hiding or reporting er-
roneous route error messages. Moreover, SMT does not require
prolonged observation periods to characterize misbehaving
nodes as adversaries, and it is not prone to “blackmail” attacks
by adversaries disseminating false misbehavior reports. Finally,
SMT does not impose the overhead and the resultant delay
of message exchange with all nodes along a faulty route. The
performance of such a fault-detection scheme is not presented
in the literature; however, its overhead may be justified in the
special case that two nodes are unable to communicate for
long periods of time. Then, a detection algorithm could be
initiated, so that the source discards only links incident to the
adversaries, rather than the entire nonoperational route. The
system requirements and operational conditions under which
such an approach can be practical is part of our future research.
VII. CONCLUSION
We presented and analyzed the SMT and SSP protocols
for secure data communication in ad hoc networks. The two
protocols are widely applicable, as they provide lightweight
end-to-end security services, and operate without knowledge
of the trustworthiness of individual network nodes. They are
highly effective, achieving highly reliable, low-delay, and
low-jitter communication even in highly adverse settings.
SMT can support real-time communication, providing nearly
constant delay and jitter, delivering 93% of the messages with
no retransmissions, even when 50% of the network nodes
disrupt the data transmission. Even with a small number of
routes at hand, SMT can deliver, for example, more than 98%
of the messages with limited retransmissions, when 30% of the
network nodes are adversaries.
SMT and SSP are versatile, as they automatically adapt their
operation to resource constrained environments, as well as
application requirements. In fact, our protocols span a large
space of solutions, offering the flexibility to tradeoff overhead
for enhanced fault-tolerance and reliability, or tradeoff delay
and delay variability for low overhead. For example, SSP
can be equally reliable to SMT, while imposing less than one
third of SMT’s network overhead. At the same time, they are
robust, as their adaptation cannot be abused by adversaries,
and resilient to arbitrary data transmission disruptions. Finally,
components of SMT and SSP, such as the fault detection or
the path survival estimation, could be applicable in other types
of networks (e.g., wireline), and for different communication
patterns (e.g., multicast).
Overall, the security and fault-tolerance of the data commu-
nication are paramount in the inherently insecure and unreliable
ad hoc networking environments. This is true for both civilian
systems vulnerable to malicious and selfish users and rogue net-
work devices, as well as tactical systems that operate in hostile
environments. We believe that protocols such as SMT and SSP,
in conjunction with secure routing protocols such as SRP [1],
[17], SLSP [5], or QoS-SRP [7], can be the catalyst for the wide
deployment of ad hoc network based applications.
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APPENDIX
We assume that: 1) there is a finite number of pairs;
2) a new path is discovered up to times if the previously used
one is deemed failed; 3) at most packets are transmitted in
total during the protocol session; and 4) path reliabilities take
values from a finite set , with . Then, we define
the following.
1) The set of acts , as the set of all unordered -pairs.
We denote the th pair as act .
2) The set of states , as the set of ordered -tuples
of path reliabilities.
3) The set of outcomes , as the set of three-tuples
of the numbers of transmitted (TX)
and received (RX) packets, and discovered (DR) routes
for each and .
4) The protocol profit per delivered packet , the protocol
cost per transmitted packet , and the route discovery
cost .
5) The utility function , for each and
(7)
For each state , let be the act with the best outcome,
which yields the highest utility . For each act , we cal-
culate the regret with respect to the utility of the best outcome
(8)
The maximum regret, over all possible states, if act were
performed, is
(9)
We can now derive an order of preference for all acts using the
MiniMax Regret rule, with an act being more preferable if and
only if its maximum regret is lower
(10)
We assume that increases as the number of delivered
packets across a path increases, and decreases as the number of
transmitted packets and route discoveries increase. We consider
the reception of a packet significantly more valuable than the
cost of a packet transmission, i.e., , and the cost of a
route discovery higher than the benefit from a packet reception
. For and , the utility
function has the form
(11)
Since at most packets are transmitted, the utility is bounded,
, taking negative
values when no or very few packets are delivered across the DR
paths.
We first consider the selection of . Independently of the
failure pattern, the lower is, the more failed transmissions are
required before the route is deemed failed. Then, all states
with taking low values, for , will yield lower
utility and, thus, higher regret than those states with relatively
more reliable paths utilized first. For and some unreli-
able route, with , . The state with the least utility
(and, thus, maximum regret) will be the one at which the pro-
tocol successively utilizes routes with , causing ,
, . Thus, values for close to zero must be
avoided.
On the other hand, implies that the protocol will
tend to discard a route even though it is highly reliable. Now, the
regret will be high if is high but not close to 1, because the
protocol will then be driven to discard all routes. The number
of delivered packets across each route can be much fewer than
the number of packets delivered had the protocol
never discarded the route. For example, can imply
100 failures occurring after 900 successful transmissions
, or loss of one every ten packets
, with two orders of magnitude lower utility
in the latter case. Thus, should not approach .
The selection of values for is dominant over the selection of
values for , when is close to or , since reinstatement
of the path rating is irrelevant when the path is never discarded,
and it has only limited impact, if any, when almost always the
path is discarded independently of its prior history. The selection
of becomes more significant when takes values in the area
between the two extremes. Using implies that a highly
reliable route will not be reinstated after one or more failures. If
the route is discarded, delivered packets can be fewer than the
packets delivered if the route were not discarded. As a result,
should not be used. The above discussion leads to the
Theorem in Section IV-B.
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